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ABSTRACT. Since property ownership affords the elderly some control over resources 
and perhaps even support and respect from potential caretakers, examination of the 
decision to transfer property to children can help us gain insight into the underlying 
dynamics of intergenerational exchanges between the elderly and their children. In this 
paper we use data from the 1989 Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly in 
Talwan to explore the demographic and social characteristics associated with pre-mortem 
property division. From both bivafiate and multivariate analyses, we find that the 
likelihood of property division is positively related to age, widowhood, natality in 
Taiwan, rural residence, and the number of living children, and negatively related to 
education. After controlling for other characteristics, our results show that widows are 
more than twice as likely as widowers to have divided all their property. These results 
lend statistical support to findings in the ethnographic literature on the Chinese family. 
Key Words: old age security, resource control, property transfer, inheritance, Chinese 
culture, Asia 
Having reached the end of its demographic transition, Taiwan now faces social 
and economic challenges posed by an aging population. As in many Asian 
countries, care for the elderly has traditionally been borne by the family. For 
example, the World Health Organization study in Fiji, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and the Republic of Korea found that between 70 and 80 percent of older people 
aged 60 and over lived with their children (Andrews, Esterman, Braunack- 
Mayer and Rungie 1986). Co-residence is usually taken as an indicator of family 
relations. With respect to Taiwan, the 1989 Survey of Health and Living Status 
of the Elderly has found that about 75 percent of ever-married persons aged 60+ 
with at least one living child currently live with a child (Casterline, Williams, 
Hermalin, Chang, Chayovan, Cheung, Domingo, Knodel and Ofstedal 1991). 
Although traditional living arrangements remain the norm, their prevalence has 
declined over time. The decline in part reflects the parents' desire for privacy 
and independent living (Moore 1990; Sun 1991; Chang and Ofstedal 1991). 
However, many researchers believe that in the whole Asia and Pacific region, 
traditional filial piety has been weakening or will inevitably weaken (e.g. 
Freedman 1986; Martin 1988). Although the family will likely continue to act as 
the main source of elderly support in Taiwan in the near term, government 
policies reflect a deepening concern over an erosion of eldercare provided by the 
family (Moore 1990). I 
Study of pre-mortem transfers of property control from the elderly to their 
children merits further research because it can help us better understand family 
dynamics and old age security. Economists have concentrated on intergenera- 
tional transfers in bequests and particularly on the motivation of benefactors (cf  
Becker and Tomes 1979; Becket 1991; Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers 1985). 
Several economic models of transfer behavior can be helpful for thinking about 
pre-mortem property division by parents. For example, the "allruism" model 
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hypothesizes that parents' "utility is raised when their children are better oft" 
(Becket 1991: 5), whereas the more strategic motive of "self-interested ex- 
change" assumes that parents' actions anticipate the behavior of their children. 
The decision to divide property is generally prefaced by careful consideration 
and perhaps some awkward negotiation. Parents may want to retain control of 
their assets if such control guarantees their economic well-being at older ages or 
the receipt of care from children. Simmons (1945: 46) has argued that even in 
primitive societies, property rights "have played a significant role in providing 
security for individuals facing old age." In a broader sense, the attitudes of the 
elderly towards property division, as with inheritance, can serve as an indicator 
of intergenerational relations (cf. Tsuya and Martin 1992). If property division 
diminishes old age security, knowledge of characteristics associated with high 
risk of property division would benefit formulation of government policies. The 
objective of this paper, therefore, is not to test a particular economic framework 
but rather to examine in a systematic way differentials in property division by 
selected demographic and social characteristics of an older population. 
Perhaps because reasonably good data on wealth or property transfers 
between living parties are rarely available, empirical research on the deter- 
minants of property transfers (or non-transfers) has been limited. With respect to 
Chinese societies, Ho (1967: 163) has remarked that "detailed descriptions of 
the division of family property are rather scarce because Neo-Confucian and 
more ancient teachings did not favor the keeping of such accounts." Since Ho's 
writing, a number of ethnographic studies have appeared that offer some insight 
into the process of property partition and inheritance among Chinese families 
(cf Wolf 1968; Pasternak 1972; Ahem 1973; Cohen 1976; Cohen 1978; 
Freedman 1979; Sung 1981; Pasternak 1983; Greenhalgh 1985; Watson 1985). z 
Although of enormous interest, it is difficult to generalize from the extant 
literature about the characteristics of persons who have experienced the division 
of property. Multivariate analyses of the factors associated with property 
division are even scarcer. Data from the 1989 Survey of Health and Living 
Status of the Elderly in Taiwan on property ownership and property division, 
including information on how long ago property was divided, enable us for the 
first time to offer some generalizations that can serve to broaden our understand- 
ing of the underlying dynamics of pre-mortem intergenerational exchanges by 
the Chinese on the island of Taiwan, Based on a random sample of 4,049 
respondents representative of the elderly population in Taiwan, this survey 
provides unusually detailed information about the individual characteristics of 
the elderly, their children, and their main sources of support. 
These data from Taiwan lend credence to the claim that property ownership 
gives the elderly some control over their resources, and perhaps even the amount 
of support and respect they receive from potential caretakers. More than 68 
percent of those surveyed responded "yes" to the question, "Do you think it's 
important for old people nowadays to keep some property to make sure their 
family treats them with respect?" This suggests that many may feel that 
adequate support and care will continue so long as they control a sizable portion 
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of "family" wealth. Responses to this question were independent of the respon- 
dent's place of birth, sex, age, marital status, education, number of living 
children, total monthly income, and even whether property has been completely, 
partially, or not yet divided among children. However, respondents who 
received less frequent care if ill in the last year were more likely to affirm the 
importance of property ownership for respect, as were those who felt less loved 
by their children. Given that division of family property does occur, it is safe to 
say that either the economic security gained from control of family property is 
greatly exaggerated, or that other considerations persuasively argue against 
keeping property intact. Before we present the empirical analysis of the factors 
in pre-mortem property division, we briefly discuss the cultural context of 
property division in Chinese society since cultural expectations concerning 
property transfers and bequests may shape decision-making behaviors of both 
parents and children. 
TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY DIVISION 
According to custom, property was usually divided among sons, the largest 
portion sometimes going to the eldest son (cf Freedman 1979; Wolf and Huang 
1980). 3 Chen (1985: 124) has observed that women inherited property "only in 
rare and exceptional cases, for instance when there was no son in the family or 
when the family failed to adopt one before the death of the male head of the 
household." In his research on family property in traditional China, Shiga 
(1978: 135) has documented the practice since ancient times of leaving a portion 
of the property (usually a fixed piece of land) for parents, "under the title yang 
lao (for support of old age) or yang shan (support and care)." 
Taiwan's Law of Succession stipulates that other than the spouse, first order 
rights of inheritance to property go to blood-lineal descendants, followed by (in 
order) parents, brothers and sisters, and grandparents. As stipulated by law, any 
inheritance is to be equally divided among the spouse and first order heirs. 4 
Although not popular among the Chinese, a will supersedes laws of succession. 
Should a will exclude a lawful heir, recourse can be sought through Title VI of 
the Law of Succession which stipulates compulsory portions. The compulsory 
portion for a child, parent, or spouse is one-half that which each would have 
inherited absent a will. Although contemporary inheritance laws include 
daughters as equal beneficiaries, there is evidence that women have been 
pressured to waive their rights to inheritance (Cohen 1978; Tang 1985). Chen 
(1985) has even suggested that one way for parents (usually the father) to 
circumvent equal inheritance to children of both sexes is to transfer all the 
family estate to the sons so that there would be no inheritance at the time of the 
father's death. Backed by both tradition and law, a son's expectation that he will 
inherit at least some of the family property is thus justifiable, whereas a 
daughter's is less certain. 
Schurmann (1956: 512) has noted that in traditional Chinese society, "there 
was no legal or customary force demanding division upon [the ancestor's] death. 
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Division was inherently the result of dissension within the family and pressure 
from without, in particular the fiscal pressure of the state. The predominance of 
division among the peasant masses reflects both of these pressures." The 
marriage of a son or division of the family can also trigger the act of property 
division. 5 In Taiwan today, other external forces may pressure the division of 
property prior to the death of the patriarch or matriarch. According to legal 
experts, the "high inheritance tax not only motivates children to obtain title to 
properties prior to their parents' demise but also prompts parents to transfer 
properties [during their lifetime] to their children ... by all possible means. As a 
solution to this, voices have recently been heard in the Legislative Yuan for the 
lowering of inheritance tax rates so as to encourage payment of the tax" (Chun 
Li, personal communication April 1992). 6 If one assumes that parents take their 
children's welfare into account, timely avoidance of the inheritance tax may 
serve as a catalyst in the decision to transfer property, especially as the parent 
gets on in years. 7 
Whatever economic reasons there are to divide the property, the actual 
transfer will likely depend on the importance placed on property ownership as a 
means for controlling both economic and caregiving resources. The existence of 
formal contracts that stipulate the exchange of care for property (cf. Cohen 
1978) makes explicit the concerns of the benefactor. Anecdotal evidence from 
West Town, China, for example, suggests that aged fathers "do not necessarily 
enjoy much authority over their male children once the latter are married and 
have taken a portion of the family property" (Hsu 1967: 131). Recall also that 
regardless of demographic or socioeconomic characteristics, more than 68 
percent of the elderly surveyed in Taiwan consider property ownership to be 
important for ensuring respectful treatment by family members. If property 
ownership indeed contributes critically to old age security, it is important to 
identify those elderly with greater likelihood of property division. As we shall 
see, property division does not occur uniformly across demographic and social 
groups. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data for this study come from the 1989 Survey of  Health and Living Status of 
the Elderly in Taiwan, which are based on a national probability sample of the 
entire elderly population aged 60 and over. Details of the sampling plan and 
questionnaire are available elsewhere (Taiwan Provincial Institute of Family 
Planning, Population Studies Center and Institute of Gerontology, University of 
Michigan 1989). Self-reported responses to the question on property division 
("Have you (and your spouse) divided part or all properties among your 
children?") fall into four categories: 1) all divided; 2) part divided; 3) none 
divided; and 4) no property. Various interpretations of the term "property" were 
suggested by the survey responses. It was evident that respondents may not 
categorize the house which they own and in which they currently reside as 
divisible property. For example, of the 2,047 noninstitutionalized (otherwise 
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nonrestricted) respondents who reported self or spouse as the owner of current 
residence, 5 percent claimed to have divided all property and 15 percent claimed 
to have no property. One explanation for the apparent inconsistency may be that 
the respondent actually has no property and the spouse has sole ownership of the 
house. Shared ownership of property between a husband and wife also presents 
some ambiguity. In the case where property was divided among the wife and 
children at the time of the patriarch's death, it is unclear whether a widow would 
respond that her and her deceased husband's property has been divided totally or 
partially. It is conceivable that the widow could respond that her property (i.e. 
the portion she has owned solely since her husband's death) has not yet been 
divided. An example of the importance of the distinction between family 
property and personal property arises in reference to the wife's dowry. Shiga 
(1978: 118) has observed that the wife's dowry "remains the property of the 
couple" and "is never pooled with the household property belonging to a larger 
group that includes the husband's parents and brothers. This was a cardinal rule, 
unchanged throughout the ages." Indeed, for those in rural Taiwan today, Chert 
(1985:117) reports that "the major portion of a dowry is considered as property 
given to the bride for her own use and control." Finally, it is unclear whether 
substantial gifts of assets to children (e.g., dowries, money to start a business) 
are perceived by the respondents to be transfers of property. Although clarifica- 
tion of the distinctions between personal and family property, and the nature of 
the assets constituting divisible property, must await future follow-up surveys, 
we are convinced that the quality of the 1989 survey data remains high and that 
analysis using these data enable us to begin to generalize for the first time about 
the characteristics of the elderly who are prone to property division. 
Of the noninstitutionalized respondents with at least one living child, 15.5 
percent claimed to have divided all property; 10.1 percent have divided part; 
45.3 percent have not divided any; and 29.1 percent reportedly had no property. 
Whether or not a respondent has divided his or her property, or whether the 
respondent had any property to begin with, does not appear to affect perceptions 
about the importance of keeping property to ensure respect from family 
members (Table I). Table I also reveals that regardless of the importance placed 
on property ownership for respect, consistently about 15 percent have divided all 
their property and about 45 percent have not yet divided any of their property. 
The Pearson chi-square statistic under the null hypothesis of independence 
between perceived importance of keeping property and actual division of 
property is 5.7 for 6 de~ees of freedom. The apparent independence between 
attitude and behavior may mask the underlying dynamics of decision-making at 
work. A respondent's attitude about the importance of property ownership may 
influence the decision to (or not to) transfer property, while the events occurring 
subsequent to property division can help shape current attitude about the 
importance of property ownership. Thus, just as property division can alter total 
monthly income, property may be kept intact precisely because division would 
lower income. The confounding of attitude and behavior, or action and outcome, 
makes it difficult to determine the direction of causality, especially since we are 
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TABLE I 
Perceived importance of keeping property and actual division of property 
"Have you divided part 
or all properties among 
your children?" 
"Do you think it's important for old people nowadays to 
keep some property to make sure their family treats them 
with respect?" 
No Depends Yes Total 
All 159 13 394 566 
28.1 2.3 69.6 100.0 
Part 124 8 236 368 
33.7 2.2 64.1 100.0 
None 477 38 1,153 1,668 
28.6 2.3 69.1 100.0 
No property 345 34 788 1,167 
29.6 2.9 67.5 100.0 
Total 1,105 93 2,571 3,769 
29.3 2.5 68.2 100.0 
Notes: Row percentages shown in italics. Pearson x 2 = 5.7, 6 d.f. Missing 
observations: 241. 
Source: 1989 Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly in Taiwan (non- 
institutionalized population only). 
currently limited to data from only one cross-section. We have therefore chosen 
to incorporate in the analysis only the relatively fixed characteristics of the 
respondent, with particular attention given to demographic variables. 
For the empirical analysis, we are interested in identifying the characteristics 
of the respondents who have divided their property. The remainder of our 
analysis is restricted to those individuals for whom property division is a 
realistic choice, i.e. those respondents who have property to divide (about 70 
percent of the total sample) and who have at least one living child (94.6 percent 
of the total sample). We also exclude from our analysis the elderly living in 
institutions (less than 1 percent of the sample), most of whom have no property. 
Explanatory variables are of two types: demographic (age, sex, marital status, 
number of living children, number of living sons); and social (education, place 
of birth, type of residence), All independent variables are categorical and are 
represented by blocks of dichotomous indicators in regression analysis. Eth- 
nicity was excluded from the analysis because an earlier analysis (Li and Lin 
1992) revealed that the only interesting differentials by ethnicity are the contrast 
between Mainlanders and Taiwan natives, which is captured by the place of 
birth variable. We begin first by examining the patterns in property division 
outcome by the selected demographic and socal characteristics individually. 
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Since there is a natural order to our dependent variable, property division 
outcome, ordered probit analysis (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975) is employed to 
model the factors associated with the likelihood of total or partial property 
division in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. In the ordered probit 
model, we assume that there is a continuously distributed latent variable y* that 
gives rise to the observed ordinal variable y (y = 0 if none divided, 1 if  part 
divided, and 2 if all divided). We treat y as a discrete realization of y* through 
the following threshold measurement model (e.g., Xie 1989: 336): 
y = 2ifp._<y* 
y =  l i f 0 _ < y * < g  
y = 0 i f y *  <0,  
where g is the threshold (to be estimated) separating y --- 2 and y = 1, and 0 is the 
normalized threshold separating y = 1 and y = 0. We next regress y* linearly on 
independent variables (x). That is, for the ith person, 
y * =  ~ ' X  i -1~ e i, 
i . ____ 
where _~ is the parameter vector. After we assume the independence of e i across 
observations and the standard normal distribution for e i, the model is estimable 
via the maximum likelihood method. Note the following relationship between 
probabilities and model parameters: 
Prob(y I = 2) = 1 - O(~t - _~'x i) 
Prob(y i = 1) = q~(~t - _~'x i) - ~(0 - _~'_x i) 
Prob(y i = 0) = ~(0 - lYx/), 
where ~(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. 
FINDINGS 
Bivariate Analyses 
Patterns in property division by individual explanatory variables are shown in 
Table II. The first three columns in Table II are row percentages. A separate 
ordered probit model was run for each block of explanatory variables so that 
comparisons could be made with the multivariate model to be presented later. 
For each model, the first coefficient for the reference category is the intercept 
(indicated by an asterisk) and the other coefficients indicate the effects of the 
independent variables on the latent tendency to have divided property. Because 
all the independent variables are dummy variables, the effects here always 
represent contrasts with the reference category. The statistical significance 
testing for global differences is assessed using the log-likelihood zZ-statistic with 
the number of degrees of  freedom equal to the number of _~ parameters, except 
for the intercept, in the model (reported in the last two columns for each block of 
independent variables). A unique threshold parameter (~t) is estimated and 
reported for each model in Table II. 
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With each successive age group, it is apparent that the proportion of respon- 
dents who have divided all property among their children increases (from 11.7 
to 49.3 percent) and the proportion who have not yet divided their property 
steadily decreases (from 75.5 to 34.1 percent). This pattern gives rise to two 
plausible interpretations: 1) the likelihood of property division increases with 
age, particularly with the increased risk of losing a spouse; 2) cohort differences 
reflect changes in attitudes of the elderly through time. The "younger-old" may 
be more determined to maintain ownership of their property, particularly if 
concern about old-age security has intensified over time as a result of declining 
fertility and the perceived weakening of traditional values. 
Although there is virtually no difference between male and female respon- 
dents as to the proportion who have divided part of their property to their 
children, the differential in percentages by sex among those who have divided 
all their property (15.0 percent of male versus 33.2 percent of female respon- 
dents) and those who have not yet divided any of their property (70.9 percent of 
male versus 52.4 percent of female respondents) is quite striking. If women feel 
(or are socialized into thinking) they are less capable of managing property, they 
may be more inclined to delegate such duties to their children. We speculate that 
women may be more likely to consider an exchange of property for care (e.g. 
Gailin 1986). Part of the differential in property division by sex may also be 
attributed to the tradition that property is divided at the time of the patriarch's 
death. 
As anticipated, property division was much more often associated with 
widowed respondents. It is reasonable that the death of a spouse often prompts 
the division of family property. Only 38.8 percent of widowed respondents have 
not yet divided any of their property, compared with 71.3 percent of currently 
married respondents. We expect that if property is divided generally at the time 
of death, the effect of widowhood still should be strong even after controlling 
for age. We also suspect that there will be a stronger effect of widowhood if the 
respondent is female. 
Not surprisingly, male respondents tended to have more education than their 
female counterparts. About 65 percent of female respondents were illiterate 
compared to about 21 percent of male respondents. Education was reported for 
both the respondent and the spouse in number of years of schooling completed. 
Since it is likely that the decision to divide property is influenced to a greater 
extent by the educational level of the husband rather than of the wife, we chose 
to use own education if the respondent is male and spouse's education if the 
respondent is female. If spouse's education was not applicable or not stated for a 
female respondent, own education served as a proxy. 8 Education was specified 
as a categorical variable with three levels: illiterate; primary/can read (1-6 
years); and junior high or junior vocational or higher (7-17 years). Classification 
of property division by educational level shows the prevalence of property 
division to decrease with education. It is possible that the more educated may be 
better able to manage their properties than the less educated. Because younger 
respondents tend to be more educated, part of the differences by education may 
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also reflect cohort effects represented by age. 
Large differences in property division behavior were observed by place of 
birth (Taiwan or Mainland China). Whereas more than half of the Taiwanese 
have not yet divided their property, almost 90 percent of the Mainlanders have 
yet to divide their property. These findings may be explained partly by the 
composition of the Mainlanders (see Hermalin, Ofstedal and Chi 1992 for 
further details on the dramatic differences in demographic composition between 
Taiwanese and Mainlander elderly). Only 16 percent of the Mainlanders in our 
sample (i.e. noninstitutionalized persons with at least one living child and 
property to divide) are female compared to the Taiwanese respondents, of whom 
47 percent are female. Relative to the native Taiwanese, Mainlanders are 
younger, report higher levels of education, more often live in urban areas, are 
less often widowed, and generally have fewer children. Many of these factors 
may help to explain the persistence of Mainlanders in avoiding property 
division. Property division was also more common among rural residents, less 
common in urban areas, and even less likely in large cities. Residential dif- 
ferences in property division may reflect the differences in land holdings; land is 
easier to carve up and use in rural areas whereas land is scarcer in urban areas. 
We have already controlled for the availability of children by selecting for our 
analysis only those respondents who have at least one living child. Of the 2,666 
respondents in our working sample, 2,000 have four or more living children. 
The less frequent occurrence of property division for those respondents with 
only one living child compared to those with more living children may reflect 
the irrelevance of property division considerations if there is a sole heir. 
Although we would conclude from the )(-statistic that property division 
outcomes are affected by the number of living children (Z2 = 15.7, 2 d.f.), it is 
interesting to note that the effect of having a living son is not statistically 
significant (g2 = 2.72, 1 d.f.). 
Multivariate Analysis 
The preceding bivariate results can be seen as the "total effects" of the ex- 
planatory variables on the outcome of property division, clearly different from 
the "net effects" controlling for the presence of other explanatory variables. For 
example, we would like to know whether there is a net difference between 
women and men after we control for the fact that men generally have more 
education than women. Similarly, we would like to test whether Mainlanders are 
indeed less likely to divide than Taiwanese after we control for the composi- 
tional differences in age, education, sex, residence, and number of children 
between the two groups. In our multivariate analysis, we achieve statistical 
controls by simultaneously including various additive effects and interaction 
effects in a single ordered probit model. In Table 1II, we report three such 
models. All independent variables are categorical and are represented by blocks 
of dichotomous indicators in the recessions. Since property division appeared 
to be independent of the availability of living sons in the bivariate analysis, the 
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number of living children was selected as the more appropriate offspring 
variable. 
The ordered probit coefficients and standard errors based on Model 1 with 
only additive effects are shown in the first two columns of Table III. The 
coefficients show the effect of a particular demographic or social characteristic 
on the likelihood of property division. Overall, the estimated effects of the 
explanatory variables in Model 1 are much smaller, albeit in the same directions, 
than those singularly estimated from the bivariate models reported in Table II. 
The tendency for property division remains higher if the respondent belongs to 
an older age group, is female, widowed, or has more children. The tendency 
towards property division is lower if the respondent is (or has a spouse who is) 
more educated, was born in the Mainland (as opposed to in Taiwan), or 
currently resides in urban areas (particularly in large cities). These findings 
demonstrate that the earlier bivariate results are still valid qualitatively within 
the multivariate context, even though a large part of the bivariate effects is due 
to confounding by other variables. 
Including an interaction effect between sex and type of residence in Model 2 
provided significantly greater explanatory power (Z2=6.15, 2 d.f.). The 
estimated coefficients suggest that although female respondents are overall more 
likely to have divided property, the male-female difference is significantly 
smaller in urban areas or large cities than in rural areas. Alternatively, they 
suggest that the effects of residence are significant for the most part only for 
women. 
If the death of a patriarch would more likely prompt the division of property, 
we expect the probability of property division to be higher for persons who are 
female and widowed, i.e. there should be a strong interaction effect between 
property division and being a widowed female. Indeed, the inclusion of the 
interactions between sex and marital status in Model 3 improves the explanatory 
power of Model 2 (Z2 = 30.94, 2 d.f.). The coefficient for the interaction between 
female and widowhood is estimated to be large (0.651) with a small standard 
error (0.119), meaning that females' higher risk of property division is further 
raised if they have lost their husband, or alternatively, the effect of widowhood 
is larger for females than for males. 
To interpret the interaction coefficients in terms of probabilities rather than in 
latent probits, we plot the predicted probabilities by sex and place of residence 
(Figure 1) and by sex and marital status (Figure 2). It is evident that the 
residence effects are much larger for women than for men. Women in large 
cities had a higher predicted probability for total property division than men in 
large cities (18.3 percent versus 12.2 percent), but the contrast between the sexes 
is much greater in rural areas (32.1 percent versus 15.4 percent). This suggests 
that women in rural areas are less likely than urban women to break with 
tradition and share equal power with male family members. Another explanation 
could be that women in large cities may be better able to counter pressures to 
divide their property. 
Estimated probabilities of property division (i.e., prob(All), prob(Part), 
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Fig. 1. Predicted probabilities of property division by type of residence and sex 
Note: Predicted probabilities are based on Model 3 
prob(None)) differ slightly by sex in comparisons based on the married popula- 
tion: 71.7 percent of married men have not divided their property compared to 
69.6 percent of married women. The probability of dividing all property is 
higher for both widowed males and widowed females when compared to the 
probabilities for males and females who are not widowed (Figure 2). Widowed 
females are substantially more likely to divide all their property than are 
widowed males. Where 19.5 percent of widowed men would be expected to 
have all their property divided, the analogous probability for widowed women is 
44.2 percent. Women are thus more than twice as likely to have divided all 
property in their widowhood than older men. 
Since the 1989 survey also queried respondents about when property was 
divided, we find some support for the notion that for those who are widowed 
and have divided property, the division coincides with the time of the spouse's 
death, particularly if the respondent is female. For 36 percent of widowed 
female respondents who reported property division and who had at least one 
living child, the division occurred around the time of the spouse's death, 
compared to 19 percent of widowed male respondents under similar conditions. 
Limiting our scope to noninstitutionalized widows at risk of dividing property 
(i.e. those with at least one living child and property to divide or property 
already divided), we calculated for each demographic and social group the 
proportion whose property was divided within one year of the spouse's death. 
The denominator therefore includes widowed respondents who could have, but 
did not, divide their property. Division of property coincided with the time of 
spouse's death for almost 20 percent of the respondents (N=686). Coincidences 
between the time of the spouse's death and the time property was divided were 
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found for more than 20 percent of the female and rural respondents - groups 
conventionally thought to be less advantaged than their counterparts. Coin- 
cidences also occurred more frequently for respondents associated with an 
illiterate patriarch, for those with two or more living children, and for those with 
one or more living sons, relative to those with one child or no sons. The latter 
may reflect the difficulties of consensus-building in larger families about what 
to do with intestate property. Contrasts by sex, place of birth, ethnicity, and 
numbers of children showed the greatest differentials in proportions, 
CONCLUSION 
Although consideration of tax benefits may prompt the pre-mortem division of 
property, concern about old age security can provide a strong incentive to 
discourage division. We readily acknowledge that sibling rivalry and other 
psychodynamic factors can accelerate or stall the division of family property but 
our data do not allow us to adequately address these issues. Instead, we have 
used data from the 1989 Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly in 
Taiwan to explore the demographic and social characteristics associated with 
property division. The understanding that control of family property is trans- 
ferred to the children (which appears to be reflected in legal codes, tradition and 
convention) may become increasingly conditional on the filial behavior of the 
children if we assume that individuals maximize the likelihood that they will be 
cared for in old age. I f  old age security is indeed of concern to the elderly, we 
should not be surprised to see greater transfer going to the person(s) most likely 
to provide care. It may even be in the government's interest to lower the 
FAMILY PROPERTY 1N TAIWAN 65 
inheritance tax in order to mitigate incentives for the elderly to transfer their 
properties prematurely. Ownership of property may provide the elderly with 
more economic security, and perhaps preserve for them a degree of indepen- 
dence that may prove helpful in negotiations with family members. The fact that 
our findings showed widowed women to be particularly prone to property 
division raises the question of whether property division guarantees or threatens 
old age security. 
In our empirical analysis, we have incorporated relatively fixed demographic 
and social characteristics of the elderly respondents. From both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses, we found that the likelihood of property division was 
positively related to age, widowhood, natality in Taiwan, rural residence, and 
the number of living children, and negatively related to education. After 
controlling for other characteristics, our results show that widows are more than 
twice as likely as widowers to have divided all their property. Since the survey 
data enable us to generalize our findings to the entire population of Taiwan, 
these results complement findings from anthropological studies on the Chinese 
family. We certainly recognize the importance of other economic and emotional 
factors that may predicate the division of property, e.g. income, retirement, 
attitudes concerning the importance of keeping property, and perceptions about 
the amount of respect, love, and support received. However, the correct 
specification of causal linkages between such variables and property division is 
difficult to establish from one set of cross-sectional data. Just as property 
division can alter total monthly income, property may not be divided precisely 
because the division of property affects the outcome (e.g., support, respect). 
These considerations can be addressed in part by the future availability of 
longitudinal data, which should allow us to better incorporate the behavior, 
attitudes, and economic attributes of the elderly in an analysis of property 
transfers. A more detailed follow-up survey of the respondents who participated 
in the 1989 Survey is planned for late 1992. When these data become available, 
we also expect to be better able to separate age and cohort effects. 
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NOTES 
I See also Taiwan Provincial Government Bulletin, Issue no. 65, Winter 1988 which 
represents the Provincial govemment's plan concerning senior citizen welfare measures. 
2 See also Simmons (1945) and Goldstein, Schuler and Ross (1983) on the connection 
between control of resources and receipt of care in other societies. 
3 Liu (1959:69 as cited in Ho 1967: 163) concluded from an extensive analysis of 
traditional Chinese clan rules that "The principle of giving each son an equal share of 
inheritance varied somewhat with local custom. In some places, the eldest son received a 
double share of inheritance either on the ground of his having more grown-up offspring 
than his younger brothers, or in partial imitation of the ancient feudal rule of primogeni- 
ture. Sons of the wife usually got more than the sons of a concubine. But many localities 
allowed none of these deviations from the principle [of equal inheritance]." It is also of 
interest to note the distinction between inherited and acquired property. Wolf (1981: 349) 
has pointed out that "with the exception of a small share granted the son of the eldest son, 
inherited property is always divided equally among brothers. Acquired property, by 
contrast, is divided according to individual effort." 
4 Cf. Article 1138. In the absence of a will, the spouse's portion of intestate property 
ranges from an amount at least equal to that of each of the first order heirs (i.e., children 
or lineal descendants by blood) up to the whole inheritance if there are no other heirs 
(Article 1144). 
5 In linking property transactions with family developments in Taiwan, Susan Green- 
halgh (1985: 587) has convincingly argued that a substantial portion of properties are 
obtained by sons "mostly just before (i.e., within one year of) [their] marriage or the 
division of the family." Since the data for Greenhalgh's paper, collected during 21 
months of research in 1978-80, were based on a nonrepresentative small sample, it is 
difficult to generalize her findings to the population of Taiwan. 
6 The inheritance tax in the Republic of China is based on the market value of the 
property at the time of death. After certain legally prescribed deductions, the rates of 
inheritance tax range from 2 percent on property valued below NT$300,000 to 26 percent 
on property valued more than NT$7,650,000 but less than NT$10,020,000 to 60 percent 
on property valued more than NT$160,000,000. Detailed graduated rates of the tax can be 
found in Article 13 of the Law. 
7 Additional incentives for pre-mortem division may exist for a farming family. Effected 
in 1953, the "Land-to-the-Tiller" Programme made ownership of farm land conditional 
on the proprietor's working the land and "stipulated that privately owned land in excess 
of specified amounts per landowner had to be sold to government, which would resell 
that land to tenants" (Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1979: 40). In his report to the Chinese- 
American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Kirby (1960: 76) noted that "many 
of the former large households had also split themselves into small families, to avoid the 
application of this Programme to themselves, and also to escape certain forms of 
taxation." It seems safe to say that nowadays this policy has little relevance for the 
general population, as the proportion of the population considered agricultural has 
declined from 51 percent in 1954 to 20 percent in 1987 (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 
1988: 65) 
8 This was the case for 30 female respondents. 
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